Personal notes on Aug 10th hearing for New Orleans Saints Jonathan Vilma

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These news conferences (four of them) were a full two months before notice of suspension.  He argues there is nothing in the CBA that mandates such press conferences alleging specific allegations.  Vilma was singled out in RG’s comments.

RG had an obligation to be either an advocate for punishment or an arbitrator but not both.  As an employer, he has the obligation to provide and maintain the appearance of fairness.

Berrigan states she understands the distinction being drawn by Ginsberg.   Even if RG decided the conduct warranted a hearing, he overstepped his bounds by making public statements before the suspension process had started.  Thus rendering him biased as an arbitrator.

The NFLPA now presents.  Kessler argues Berrigan has all the jurisdiction she needs before the Burbank appeal is heard.  RG had no jurisdiction under case law and under any view of common sense.  The CBA only provides arbitration rights for RG under Article 46 but this matter is a pay for performance and finds its jurisdiction under Article 14.

NFLPA contends RG violated the CBA by ruling on the matter not under his jurisdiction, by showing evident partiality, not producing relevant documents or adhering to industrial due process.   All of these issues give her the right to decide before the Burbank hearing.  NFLPA contends Judge has de novo (from the beginning) power to decide before Aug 30th.

NFLPA argues evident partiality shown by RG’s conduct and Berrigan is authorized to scrutinize such partiality.   NFLPA also contends RG usurped the authority of CBA provisions to hear this matter and the parsing of RG’s reasoning sliced the salami so thin it has been rendered baloney. 

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